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Abstract
Community decisions about access control in virtual communities are non-monotonic in nature. This means that they
cannot be expressed in current, monotonic trust management languages such as the family of Role Based Trust Manage-
ment languages (RT). To solve this problem we propose RT	, which adds a restricted form of negation to the standard
RT language, thus admitting a controlled form of non-monotonicity. The semantics of RT	 is discussed and presented in
terms of the well-founded semantics for Logic Programs. Finally we discuss how chain discovery can be accomplished
for RT	.
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1 Introduction
Languages from the family of Role Based Trust Management Framework (RT), like most Trust Management (TM) lan-
guages are monotonic: adding a credential to the system can only result in the granting of additional privileges. Usually,
this property is desirable in policy languages [23]. However, banishing negation from an access control language is not
a realistic option. In fact, as stated by Li et al. [16] “many security policies are non-monotonic, or more easily specified
as non-monotonic ones”; similar views are expressed by Barker and Stuckey [2] and by Wang et al. [26] in the context of
logic-based access control. This is also true for complex distributed systems such as virtual communities. In particular,
as we will show, modeling access control decisions by a community, as opposed to access control decisions by an indi-
vidual member, cannot be made without at least a form of negation, which we call negation-in-context. As pointed out by
Dung and Thang [6] a TM system should be monotonic with respect to the credential submitted by the client but could
be non-monotonic with respect to the site’s local information about the client. Our extension allows a TM system to be
non-monotonic not only in a local setting, but also when the context for negation can be provided.
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Contributions
We present a significant enhancement to the power of the RT family of trust management languages by proposing
RT	, an extension of RT0. More specifically we:
• add a single new statement type adding negation-in-context to standard RT;
• present and discuss the declarative semantics of RT	;
• show that the extension is essential to specify access control policies for virtual communities.
• describe a chain discovery algorithm for RT	.
Currently, we are using RT	 to specify and implement virtual community packages in the context of the Freeband project
I-SHARE. In the next section we discuss how access control policies in virtual communities motivate us to add negation-
in-context to RT. In Section 3 the syntax and informal semantics of RT	 is introduced. The formal semantics of RT	 is
presented in Section 4. We present related work in Section 7 and conclusions and future work in Section 8.
2 Virtual Communities
Virtual communities are groups of individuals with a shared interest, relationship or fantasy [15]. The majority of cur-
rent virtual communities is interested in sharing audio/video content using P2P systems [21]. Taking into account the
distributed nature of virtual communities, special mechanisms for access control must be provided to ensure secure op-
erations at both intra- and inter-community levels. As it is often impossible to identify strangers [20], trust must be
established between community members and entities from outside the community prior to allowing a specific access.
As an example imagine that Alice (A), Bob (B), and Carol (C) decide to form a virtual community (or just a community
for short). At the beginning they are the only members of the community, but they welcome others to join. We represent a
community by a list with an entry for each member. Each entry names the community member and the members it knows
about. For example the following list represents the community of Alice, Bob, and Carol:
A[B, C] B[A, C] C[A, B]
In this community all members know each other. As the community grows it becomes harder and harder for each
member to have complete information about all other members. Yet the community would like to protect its integrity.
Rather than to require involvement of all members in decision making, a more practical and scalable approach is to
allow decisions about membership to be taken by a group of coordinators selected from the community members. This
group of coordinators itself forms a (sub)community. To find all the coordinators we require that each coordinator has a
relationship with at least one other coordinator in such a way that all coordinators can be reached. For example in the list
below A knows B, B knows C and C knows B and A:
A[B] B[C] C[B, A]
To become a member of a community or to become a new coordinator all the existing coordinators of a given community
must approve. Trust management languages based on logic programming semantics do not support queries of this kind
directly. If one wants to know “if all coordinators approve entity A” without explicitly enumerating these coordinators,
one must check if the negation of this statement - “is there any coordinator that does not approve entity A” - holds.
If not, one can conclude that all coordinators approve entity A. Existing trust management languages [17] are strictly
monotonic, thus do not allow for negation. For this reason they are not sufficiently expressive to efficiently model complex
collaborations that commonly appear in virtual communities.
Before we can elaborate on this using the example just presented, we need to review the definition of RT0, and then
present our extension RT	.
3 RT	
We first summarise and then extend the RT0 language.
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3.1 The RT0 language
RT0 contains two basic elements: entities and role names. Entities represent uniquely identified principals, individuals,
processes, public keys, etc. Entities are denoted by names starting with an uppercase letter, for example: A, B, D, and
Alice. A role name begins with a lower case letter. In RT0, roles are denoted by the entity name followed by the role
name, separated by a dot. For instance A.r and Company.testers are roles. To define role membership, RT0 provides four
kinds of policy statements:
• A.r←− D (Simple Membership). Entity D is a member of the role A.r.
• A.r ←− B.r1 (Simple Inclusion). Every member of B.r1 is also a member of A.r. This represents delegation from
entity A to entity B.
• A.r ←− A.r1.r2 (Linking Inclusion). For every entity X who is a member of A.r1, every member of X.r2 is also a
member of A.r. This statement represents a delegation from entity A to all the members of the role A.r1. The right-hand
side A.r1.r2 is called a linked role.
•A.r←−B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2 (Intersection Inclusion). Every entity which is a member of both B.r1 and B.r2 is a member of
A.r. This statement represents partial delegation from the entity A to B1 and to B2. The right-hand side B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2
is called an intersection role. In a policy statement A.r ←− e we call A.r the head and e the body. The set of policy
statements having the same head A.r is called the definition of A.r.
3.2 Extending RT0 with negation
RT0 and other languages from the RT framework do not support negation. As argued in Section 2, this limits expressive-
ness. Let us first see an example of negation to enforce the following separation of concerns policy: “developers cannot
be testers of their own code”. We would like to express in RT something similar to the LP clause:
verifycode(?A) :- tester(?A),not developer(?A).
where ?A denotes a logical variable. This clause states that A can verify the code if A is a tester and A is not the developer
responsible for the code. RT DT - another member of the RT framework [17] - supports thresholds and delegation of
role activations; to some extent, RT DT allows to model separation of concerns without using negation. However, this
comes at the cost of having to define manifold roles (cumbersome to work with, in practice). In any case, the examples
we present in the sequel cannot be modeled in RT DT . We define a new type of statement based on RT0 and a new
role-exclusion operator	:
• A.r ←− B1.r1 	B2.r2 (Exclusion) All members of B1.r1 which are not members of B2.r2 are added to A.r.
Example Using the 	 operator we can solve the separation of concerns problem as follows:
Company.verifycode←− Company.tester 	 Company.developer. (1)
Suppose that both Alice and Bob are testers but Alice is also a developer of the code:
Company.tester←− Alice Company.tester←− Bob Company.developer←− Alice
We see that credential 1 does not make Alice be a member of the Company.verifycode role. Thus, only Bob can verify
the code.
3.3 Modeling virtual communities using RT	
Having given a simple example and its representation in RT	, we now return to the more complex scenario of community
decision making from Section 2.
Recall that we have a community of coordinators - Alice (A), Bob (B), and Carol (C). Assume that another entity - say
D - wants to join this community and asks Alice for approval. Alice can accept D as a new coordinator locally, but before
making the final decision she must check if there is no objection from other coordinators. A coordinator expresses the
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objection using a so called black list. An entity that is on the black list of one of the coordinators will not be accepted as
a new coordinator.
Table 1
Roles used by coordinators
Definition (for coordinator A) Description
Op-
tio-
nal
A.agreeToAdd←− [set of entities]
A coordinator uses this role to express that she approves an entity.
The role has a local meaning. It is not sufficient to be a member of
the agreeToAdd role to become a coordinator. It is necessary that
no other coordinators says that an entity is a member of her dis-
agreeToAdd role. The agreeToAdd role, through the allCandidates
role, provides context for the 	 operator in the definition of the the
addCoord role.
A.disagreeToAdd←−
[see description in the text] This role is used by a coordinator as a black list.
A.coord←− [set of entities] This role contains all the coordinators known by a coordinator.
A.allCoord←− A
A.allCoord←− A.allCoord.coord
This role allows a coordinator to iterate over all entities connected
by the coord role. This role, if defined, contains all the coordina-
tors.
3
A.objectionToAdd←−
A.allCoord.disagreeToAdd
A coordinator can use this role to obtain all entities for which there
is any objection. 3
A.allCandidates←−
A.allCoord.agreeToAdd
This role, if defined, contains all the candidate coordinators locally
accepted by any of the coordinators. Used as the context for the 	
operator in the body of the addCoord role.
3
A.addCoord←− A.allCandidates 	
A.objectionToAdd
After becoming a member of this role, a candidate coordinator be-
comes a new coordinator and becomes a member of the coord role. 3
Table 1 shows the minimal definition, and the descriptions of the roles used by coordinators. We see from Table 1 that
some roles are mandatory while the others are not. For instance the role disagreeToAdd must be defined by each coor-
dinator. On the other hand, the roles allCoord, allCandidates, and addCoord can be defined as needed by a coordinator.
Special attention must be given to the definition of the disagreeToAdd role. For example, a coordinator can use the
following credential to say that she distrusts any entity she does not accept locally:
A.disagreeToAdd←− A.allCandidates 	 A.agreeToAdd.
If a coordinator trusts other coordinators to select candidates she can leave the agreeToAdd role empty and use her
disagreeToAdd role to block some candidates. For example, Alice can put E on her black list to disallow E to become a
coordinator, and simultaneously accept all other candidates proposed by other coordinators:
A.disagreeToAdd←− E.
Table 2 shows the roles and their members as seen by Alice, Bob, and Carol. In this table, we assume that Alice agrees
locally to add D as a new coordinator. Also, Bob and Carol have no objection to add D as a new coordinator, but E is on
Alice’s black list and F is on the black list of Bob and Carol. As a consequence, only D is the member of the addCoord
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role of Alice. Bob and Carol do not have to define the allCoord, allCandidates 9 , objectionToAdd, and addCoord unless
they themselves add a new coordinator.
Table 2
Adding new coordinator - D is successful, E, F fail
coord agreeToAdd allCoord allCandidates disagreeToAdd objectionToAdd addCoord
Alice (A) {B} {D} {A,B,C} {D} {E} {E,F} {D}
Bob (B) {C} {} Not Defined Not Defined {F} Not Defined Not Defined
Carol (C) {B,A} {} Not Defined Not Defined {F} Not Defined Not Defined
4 Semantics
The semantics of trust management languages is typically given by a translation into Logic Programming (LP) [17]. We
will follow the same route. Trust management credentials are by definition distributed among different principals. The
use of negation creates an additional difficulty, also because in logic programming there various different semantics exist
to cope with negation. We now sketch some of the reasons why we refer to the Well-Founded semantics. The first reason
is syntactic: in a TM system it is impossible to avoid circular references, and we cannot expect policies to be (locally)
stratified. Stratification basically means that one can restructure a logic program into separate parts in such a way that
negative references from one part refer only to previously defined parts. Without the possibility of local stratification
we cannot refer to the perfect model semantics [22]. For the same reason, we certainly have to refer to a three valued
semantics: next to the truth values true and false, we have to admit the valued undefined. In short, this is because we
cannot expect the completion of a policy to be a consistent logic program in the sense described in [24]. A second point
is handling of positive circular references, as in {A.r ←− B A.r ←− B.r B.r ←− A.r}. In this case, in accordance
with the semantics of RT0, we want to be able to say that C does not belong to A.r. This forces us to exclude Kunen’s
semantics [14] (i.e. the semantics of logical consequences of the completion of the program together with the weak
domain closure assumptions), and Fitting’s semantics [8]: in both semantics the query “does C belong to A.r?” would
return undefined. These reasons brought us to adopt the well-founded (WF) semantics for LP [9]. The WF semantics
has the advantage that it imposes no restrictions on the syntax of programs, that any prolog program has a unique well-
founded model associated to it (as opposed to e.g. the stable model semantics [10]), and that the WF semantics enjoys an
elegant fixed-point construction.
4.1 Well-founded Semantics
We now introduce the WF semantics [9] for general logic programs. A general logic program is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 A general logic program is a finite set of clauses of the form: A :- L1, . . . , Ln.
Here A is an atom (the head of the clause) and L1, . . . , Ln with n ≥ 0 are literals forming the body. A literal is an atom A
(positive literal) or a negated atom ¬A (negative literal). We refer to general logic programs (GLP) simply as programs.
A fact is a clause with an empty body. The Herbrand universe of a program P , denoted by UP , is the set of all ground
terms (i.e. variable-free) constructed from constants and function symbols in P . The Herbrand base of P , denoted by
BP , is the set of ground atoms obtained from predicates in P and terms in UP . An instantiated clause of P is a ground
clause obtained by substituting terms in UP for variables in the clause in P . The Herbrand instantiation Ground(P ) of
P is the set of all instantiated clauses. A set I of ground literals is consistent if there is no atom A such that both A and
¬A are in I . An interpretation of P is a consistent set of ground literals in BP . Intuitively, atom A is true in I if A ∈ I ,
false in I if ¬A ∈ I , and undefined in I if neither A ∈ I nor ¬A ∈ I .
9 A coordinator must define the allCandidates role if she defines the disagreeToAdd role in terms of the agreeToAdd
role.
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The well-founded semantics uses unfounded sets to derive atoms that are false:
Definition 4.2 Let P be a program, I be an interpretation of P , and U be a subset of BP . U is an unfounded set of P
with respect to I if every atom A ∈ U satisfies the following condition: for every instantiated clause A :- L1, . . . , Ln ∈
Ground(P ) whose head is A, either (1) some literal L is false in I or (2) some positive literal L is also in U .
Intuitively, an unfounded set is a set of atoms which can be simultaneously declared false without having to assume
anything to be true. The union of unfounded sets is an unfounded set, and the greatest unfounded set of P with respect to
I , denoted by UP (I), is the union of all unfounded sets of P with respect to I .
Definition 4.3 Let P be a program, I be an interpretation of P . Transformations TP and WP , and the well-founded
semantics of P are defined as follows:
• A ∈ TP (I) if and only if there is A :- L1, . . . , Ln ∈ Ground(P ) such that all literals L1, . . . , Ln are true in I ;
•WP (I) is a union of TP (I) and ¬UP (I) which contains the negation of each element in UP (I) : WP (I) =
TP (I) ∪ ¬UP (I).
• The well-founded model of P is the least fixed point of WP (I).
Transformations TP (I), UP (I), and WP (I) are monotonic [9]. Let α range over all countable ordinals, the set Iα,
whose elements are literals in the Herbrand base of P , is defined recursively by: Iα+1 = WP (Iα). Iα is also a monotonic
sequence. I∞ = ∪αIα is the least fixed point of WP .
4.2 Translating RT	 to GLP
We first give the translation to LP for RT0 and, using this translation, the semantics of a set of RT0 policy statements.
Next we extend this to a translation from RT	 to GLP and the semantics for a set of RT	 policy statements.
The semantics of a set of RT0 policy statements is commonly defined by translating it into a logic program [17]. Here, we
depart from the approach of Li et al. [17] by referring to the role names as predicate symbols. The statement A.r ←− D
is, for example, translated to r(A, D) in the Prolog program. Intuitively, r(A, D) means that D is a member of the role
A.r.
Definition 4.4 Given a set P of RT0 policy statements, the semantic program,SP (P), forP is the logic program defined
as follows (recall that symbols starting with “?” represent logical variables):
• For each A.r ←− D ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, D)
• For each A.r ←− B.r1 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :- r1(B, ?Z)
• For each A.r ←− A.r1.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :- r1(A, ?Y ), r2(?Y, ?Z)
• For each A.r ←− B.r1 ∩B.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :- r1(B1, ?Z), r2(B2, ?Z)
The semantics of a role is defined as follows:
Definition 4.5 Given a set P of RT0 policy statements, the semantics of a role A.r is a set of members Z that make the
predicate r(A, Z) true in the semantic program: [[A.r]]P = {Z |SP (P) |= r(A, Z)}
We write SP (P) |= r(A, Z) for a ground atom r(A, Z) if r(A, Z) is true in SP (P). We now extend the translation of
RT0 to that of RT	 by adding the translation of the exclusion rule.
Definition 4.6 Given a setP of RT	 policy statements, the semantic program, SP (P), forP is the general logic program
defined as follows:
• For each A.r ←− B.r1 	B.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :- r1(B1, ?Z),¬r2(B2, ?Z)
• All other rules are as in definition 4.4.
We also extend the definition of the semantics of a role.
Definition 4.7 Given a set P of RT	 policy statements, the semantics of a role A.r is a set of members Z that make the
predicate r(A, Z) true in the semantic program: [[A.r]]P = {Z |SP (P) |= r(A, Z)}
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Note that, unlike before, the value of the semantical program may give value ‘unknown’ for r(A, Z). In this case the
agent Z is not considered to be a member of the role, nor of the negated role. The following example shows that care is
required when reasoning about polices which have negative circular dependencies.
Example 4.8 Consider a system with entities A, B, C, D, roles A.r, B.r and C.r and the following policy rules:
A.r ←− B.r 	 C.r C.r ←− B.r 	A.r B.r ←− D
Here D is a member of B.r, however, D is not a member of either A.r or C.r (as we do not have a way to decide in
which of the two it should go). Note that as a result we have that despite the presence of the rule A.r ←− B.r 	 C.r the
role B.r can have members that are neither in A.r nor in C.r.
The rules for A.r and C.r in the example above are referred to as negative circular dependencies; A.r depends negatively
on C.r and C.r, in turn, depends negatively on A.r. The example shows that care is required when reasoning about
policies which have negative circular dependencies.
4.3 Virtual Communities - translation to GLP
Having introduced an example of virtual community decision making in Section 2, its formalism in Subsection 3.3, we
now give the GLP semantics of the example. Translating RT	 credentials to GLP is straightforward using the rules
presented in Subsection 4.2. For the convenience of the reader we present a complete policy and the corresponding GLP
rules in Appendix A. If one asks Alice to add D to the group of coordinators she needs to check if D is a member of the
A.addCoord. This is equivalent to checking whether addCoord(A,D) holds after the translation to GLP. She does this by
checking whether D is a logical consequence of the semantic program SP (P) by first finding the semantics of the role
A.addCoord and checking if it contains entity D. The semantics of the role A.addCoord with respect to the programP is
as follows:
JA.addCoordKP = {D}.
The semantics of the roles A.allCandidates and A.objectionToAdd (these roles define the role A.addCoord) are shown
below:
JA.allCandidatesKP = {D} JA.objectionToAddKP = {E, F}.
The semantics of a role may also be an empty set: JB.agreeToAddKP = {}.
5 Credential Chain Discovery
In this section we extend the standard chain discovery algorithm to RT	 following the construction of the well-founded
semantics. Recall that the definition of a role A.r is the set of all credentials with head A.r. We assume that A stores (or at
least, is able to find) the complete definition of each of her roles A.r, i.e. that the credentials involved are issuer-traceable.
The main difficulty in the chain discovery is to obtain that B is not a member of a linked role A.r.r′. For this we need to
check that every potential member C of A.r does not have B in its role C.r′. So who are the potential members of A.r?
Thanks to negation in context we can provide a reasonable overestimation of this set using chain discovery for RT0:
Definition 5.1 For a policy P the context policy P+ is the policy obtained by replacing each credential of the form
A.r ←− B1.r1 	 B2.r2 ∈ P by A.r ←− B1.r1 and leaving the other credentials unchanged. We call [[A.r]]P+ the
context of the role A.r.
The following lemma relates roles with their contexts.
Lemma 5.2 For any policyP and role A.r we have: If SP (P) |= r(A, B) then SP (P+) |= r(A, B) and if SP (P+) 6|=
r(A, B) then SP (P) |= ¬r(A, B).
The first part of this lemma states that any role is contained in its context, [[A.r]]P ⊆ [[A.r]]P+. If B 6∈ [[A.r]]P this
means that r(A, B) is undefined or false in SP (P). The second part of the lemma states that if B 6∈ [[A.r]]P+ it must be
the latter, r(A, B) is false in SP (P). In the algorithm below we build a set of credentials C together with a set of context
membership facts I+ and a set of positive and negative membership facts I.
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Step 1. Initialise I = ∅, I+ = ∅ and C = the definition of role A.r.
Step 2. Discover context and credentials (classical chain discovery for I+ and C).
We look for new credentials top down; any credential that could possibly be relevant for role A.r is added to C. We look
for the context of A.r bottom up; any fact that can be derived from the credentials that we have found is added to I+.
Repeat the following until no changes occur: For each credential of the following form in C:
[B.r0 ←− C] add r0(B, C) to I+
[B.r0 ←− C.r1] add the definition of C.r1 to C and add r0(B, D) to I+ for all r1(C, D) in I+
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1 ∩C2.r2] add the definitions of C1.r1 and C2.r2 to C add r0(B, D) to I+ whenever r1(C1, D) and
r2(C2, D) in I+.
[B.r0 ←− C.r1.r2] add the definition of C.r1 and, for each r1(C, D) ∈ I+, the definition of D.r2 to C. Add
r0(B, D) to I+ whenever for some Y we have r1(C, Y ) and r2(Y, D) in I+.
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1 	 C2.r2] add the definitions of C1.r1 and C2.r2 to C, add r0(B, D) to I for every r1(C1, D)
Step 3. Discover positive facts in I (extended chain discovery 1).
We update I similar to I+ in the previous step, only the last case (	) changes. Repeat until I does not change, for
credentials in C of the following form:
[B.r0 ←− C] add r0(B, C) to I
[B.r0 ←− C.r1] add r0(B, D) to I for all r1(C, D) in I
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1 ∩ C2.r2] add r0(B, D) to I whenever r1(C1, D) and r2(C2, D) in I.
[B.r0 ←− C.r1.r2] Add r0(B, D) to I whenever for some Y we have r1(C, Y ) and r2(Y, D) in I.
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1	C2.r2] add r0(B, D) to I whenever r1(C1, D) ∈ I and either (¬r2(C2, D)) ∈ I or r2(C2, D) 6∈
I+.
Step 4. Extended chain discovery for negative facts in I: Building an unfounded set U (extended chain discovery 2)
We search for facts which are useful when negated in I and try to show that this fact is false by building an unfounded
set U containing the fact. We start with U = ∅.
We call an atom r(X, Y ) an unfounded-candidate (UC) if r(X, Y ) ∈ I+, r(X, Y ) 6∈ U and ¬r(X, Y ) 6∈ I. (Basically
members of the context which are not known to be false.)
Choose a rule B.r0 ←− C1.r1 	 C2.r2 ∈ C and an entity D such that r1(C1, D) ∈ I and r2(C2, D) founded and add
r2(C2, D) to U .
For every r(A, B) in U , and every matching rule A.r ←− e 10 in C perform:
[A.r ←− C] fail if C = B.
[A.r ←− C.r1] if r1(C, B) is UC then add r1(C, B) to U .
[A.r ←− C1.r1 ∩ C2.r2] if r1(C1, B) and r2(C2, B) both are UCs then choose one to add to U .
[A.r ←− C1.r1 	 C2.r2] if r1(C1, B) UC and r2(C2, B) 6∈ I then add r1(C1, B) to U .
[A.r ←− C.r1.r2] for all Y with r1(C, Y ) is UC: If r2(Y, B) UC choose one of r1(C, Y ) and r2(Y, B) and add to
U .
Fail if U and I contain any common elements. 11
? Do each possible choice in the substep above and add ¬U to I if it succeeds.
Repeat steps 3 and 4 until I remains unchanged.
(End of algorithm.) The algorithm correctly finds the members of the role A.r.
Theorem 5.3 (Soundness and completeness) The output I of the algorithm satisfies:
∀B : r(A, B) ∈ I ⇐⇒ B ∈ [[A.r]]P .
where P is the policy containing all credentials and A.r is the role being discovered.
The algorithm follows exactly the construction of the well-founded semantics 12 except that only part of the inter-
pretation is found. Thus clearly I will be a subset of the well-founded model for SP (P) (giving soundness). However,
10 The number of atoms and matching rules may grow as we add atoms to U .
11 Of course, in an actual implementation this is checked as soon as an element is added to U .
12 Steps 3 and 4 construct parts of the transformations TP and UP respectively.
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as the part of the interpretion used basically covers the contexts of A.r and all roles used to define A.r it also covers any
membership facts for A.r (giving completeness).
6 Implementation
In the current prototype storage is centralised and we assume that all credentials can be traced by the issuer. In such a
case, SLG resolution of XSB prolog can be used to compute answers to queries according to the WF model for RT	 [5].
DLV datalog [7] and the Smodels system [19] can also be used to provide an initial implementation of RT	. The Smodels
system [19] provides an implementation of the well-founded and stable model semantics for range-restricted function-
free normal programs. The Smodels system allows for efficient handling of non-stratified ground programs. The DLV
system [7] is a system for disjunctive logic programs. DLV is capable of dealing with disjunctive logic programs without
function symbols allowing for strong negations, constraints and queries. We implemented the program introduced in
sub-section 4.3 on three systems: XSB, SMODELS and DLV. To test the performance of the program on these systems,
we used two parameters: number of coordinators (Coords) and number of iterations (Iters). The higher the number of
coordinators is, the more complex the program is. The program is also executed repeatedly to compare performance
more correctly. Table A.1 in the appendix reports the execution time of the program measured by the CPU time obtained.
We cannot compare the execution time between XSB and the other two DLV and SMODELS because XSB is the goal-
oriented system while DLV and SMODELS build and return the whole model for the program. Because of this XSB
is much faster than the other two systems. DLV provides better execution time than SMODELS, especially when the
complexity of the program increases.
7 Related Work
So far little attention has been given to trust management in virtual communities. Most of the existing approaches focus
on reputation-based trust models in P2P networks [25]. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] propose a trust model that is based
on real world social trust characteristics. They also find formal logic based trust management to be ill suited as a general
model of trust. To prove this claim they refer to the early work of Burrows and Abadi [4], and Gong, Needham, and
Yahalom [11], which are more relevant to formal protocol verification than to formal reasoning on trust management. To
support their work they claim that logic based trust management systems are not suitable to be automated - the existing
literature on automated trust negotiation (ATN) yields a contradictory statement (see Seamons et al. [23]). Pearlman et
al. [20] present a Community Authorization Service - a central management unit for a community that helps to enforce the
policy of a virtual community. Such a central point of responsibility does not fit well in the spirit of P2P networks because
of their highly distributed nature. Pearlman et al. also require that there a centralised policy exists for a virtual community.
However, the policy of a virtual community may have a distributed character and can be seen as a product of the policies
of the community members. Boella and van der Torre [3] take the same direction and emphasise the distinction between
authorisations given by the Community Authorization Service and permissions granted by resource providers in virtual
communities of agents. They regard authorisation as a means used by community authorities to regulate the access of
customers to resources that are not under control of these authorities. According to Boella and van der Torre, permission
can be granted only by the actual resource owner.
As we conclude in Section 2, virtual communities are also not supported by the existing trust management languages,
even though the general requirements for such languages have been investigated [23].
Herzberg et al. propose in [12] a prolog-based trust management language (DTPL) together with a non-monotonic
version of it (TPL). Their approach is very different from ours in the sense that TLP allows for negative certificates
namely “certificates which are interpreted as suggestions not to trust a user”. This far-reaching approach leads to a more
complex logical interpretation, which includes conflict resolution. As opposed to this, our approach is technically simpler
and enjoys a well-established semantics. Jajodia et al. [13], Wang et al. [26], Barker and Stuckey [2], have in common
that they impose a stratified use of negation. Because of this, they can refer to the perfect model semantics. As we
explained in Section 4, in the context of DTM, we cannot expect policies to be stratified. Our approach is thus more
powerful than the approaches based on the stratifiable negation. Dung and Thang in [6] propose a DTM system based on
logic programming and the stable model semantics [10].
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8 Conclusions and future work
We present the language RT	, which adds a construct for ‘negation-in-context’ to the RT0 trust management system. We
argue the necessity of such a construct and illustrate its use with scenarios from virtual communities which cannot be
expressed within the RT framework.
We provide a semantics for RT	 by translation to general logic programs. We show that, given the complete policy,
the membership relation can be decided by running the translation in systems such as XSB, DLV datalog and Smodels.
We also show how, for the case that credentials are issuer traceable [18], the chain discovery algorithm for RT0 can
be extended to RT	. We are currently employing RT	 to specify virtual community policies in the Freeband project
I-SHARE. In the future we plan to examine the complexity of the presented chain discovery algorithm, ad hoc methods
to minimise communication overhead, and safe methods for chain discovery in non-‘issuer traces all’ scenarios. A
comparison with reputation systems will also be made.
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Appendix A Virtual Community - translation from RT	 to GLP
The table below shows the RT	 credentials and their translation to GLP.
RT	 rules GLP semantics
A.addCoord←− A.allCandidates	A.objectionToAdd
A.allCandidates←− A.allCoord.agreeToAdd
A.objectionToAdd←− A.allCoord.disagreeToAdd
A.disagreeToAdd←− A.allCandidates	A.agreeToAdd
A.allCoord←− A.allCoord.coord
A.allCoord←− A
A.coord←− B
B.coord←− C
C.coord←− B
C.coord←− A
A.agreeToAdd←− D
A.disagreeToAdd←− E
B.disagreeToAdd←− F
C.disagreeToAdd←− F
addCoord(A, ?Y ):- allCandidates(A, ?Y ),
¬objectionToAdd(A, ?Y ).
allCandidates(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
agreeToAdd(?Z, ?Y ).
objectionToAdd(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
disagreeToAdd(?Z, ?Y ).
disagreeToAdd(A, ?Y ):- allCandidates(A, ?Y ),
¬agreeToAdd(A, ?Y ).
allCoord(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
coord(?Z, ?Y ).
allCoord(A, A).
coord(A, B).
coord(B, C).
coord(C, B).
coord(C, A).
agreeToAdd(A, D).
disagreeToAdd(A, E).
disagreeToAdd(B, F ).
disagreeToAdd(C, F ).
10 Coords 30 Coords 50 Coords
1 Iter. 10 Iters. 20 Iters. 1 Iter. 10 Iters. 20 Iters. 1 Iter. 10 Iters. 20 Iters.
DLV 0.05s 0.81s 1.54s 0.06s 0.83s 1.55s 0.07s 0.86s 1.60s
SMODELS 0.12s 1.22s 2.32s 0.16s 1.35s 2.66s 0.19s 1.53s 2.94s
XSB ≈ 0
Table A.1
The time execution of the program on the XSB, SMODELS, and DLV systems
12
